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Effluent Limits, Ambient Quality, and Monitoring 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Effluent limits are frequently based on a uniform emission standard, which applies to all 
polluting facilities within in a single industry.  However, the implementation of many environmental 
protection laws does not lead to uniform effluent limits due to considerations of local environmental 
conditions.  In this paper, we theoretically examine the relationships among the stringency of effluent 
limits imposed on individual polluting facilities, environmental protection agencies’ monitoring 
decisions, and the ambient quality of the local environment. We then extend the theoretical analysis by 
exploring the establishment of effluent limits when (1) the national emission standard represents only 
an upper bound on the local issuance of limits and (2) negotiation efforts expended by both regulated 
polluting facilities and environmentally concerned citizens play a role. We find that the negotiated 
discharge limit depends on the political weight enjoyed and the negotiation effort costs faced by both 
citizens and the regulated facility, along with the stringency of the national standard and local ambient 
quality conditions. 
 
Keywords: effluent limits, monitoring, inspections, environmental permits, wastewater, compliance 
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1. Introduction 
Pollution control efforts begin with the issuance of effluent limits, followed by the monitoring 
of compliance with these limits on the part of regulated polluters and enforcement against non-
compliant polluters. Frequently effluent limits are based on a uniform emission standard, which applies 
to all similar polluting facilities (e.g., same industrial classification).  However, the implementation of 
many environmental protection laws in place around the world does not lead to uniform effluent limits 
due to considerations of local environmental conditions.  In particular, implementation of the U.S. 
Clean Water Act does not issue effluent limits uniformly.  Instead, each industry-specific Effluent 
Limitation Guideline represents only an upper bound on the issuance of any individual limit.1  The 
actually issued limit reflects the minimum of the level identified by the Effluent Limitation Guideline 
and the level identified by an assessment of the ambient surface water quality of the water body 
receiving the wastewater discharge.2 
The state water quality-based standard is designed to ensure that the ambient water quality of 
the receiving waterbody meets the state-based ambient quality standard, which in turn is designed to 
support the waterbody’s designated use, e.g., fishing, swimming.  In other words, the effluent limit is 
set so that the facility's discharges do not cause the water body's ambient water quality to fall below the 
acceptable level.  Effluent limits identified by state water quality-based standards may differ across 
facilities and time since state water quality standards differ within a state and across states and ambient 
water quality conditions differ across space and time. In particular, due to state water quality standards, 
the same facility may face more stringent limits in different years or in different months of the same 
year; such monthly or seasonal variation is expected since state water quality standards depend on 
seasonal stream conditions (e.g., flow) and temperature. 
                                                 
1
  Since the passage of the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, which preceded the Clean Water Act, the 
EPA has developed industry-specific Effluent Limitation Guidelines based on the degree of pollution reduction 
attainable by facilities in a given industry. 
2
  This depiction indicates that permitted effluent limit levels are determined by Effluent Limitation Guidelines, 
which apply uniformly across all facilities within a particular industry, or ambient water quality concerns, which 
do not relate to an individual facility’s ability to control discharges. 
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In practice, the water quality-based limit level becomes the binding effluent limit for several 
polluters. Thus, effluent limits differ across regulated polluters.  U.S. environmental protection 
agencies are authorized and obliged to induce compliance with these differing levels of discharge 
limits using both monitoring inspections and enforcement actions.  Yet U.S. environmental regulatory 
agencies enjoy great discretion over their monitoring decisions.  Thus, varying effluent limits might 
influence monitoring decisions. 
Although very relevant in practice, the theoretical literature on monitoring and enforcement has 
not explored the relationships among the stringency of effluent limits imposed on individual polluting 
facilities, environmental protection agencies’ monitoring decisions, and ambient quality conditions 
(see the literature review in Section 2 below). Exploration of these relationships represents our first 
research objective. As our secondary research objective, we extend the analysis to explore theoretically 
the establishment of effluent limits when the national emission standard represents only an upper 
bound on the issuance of limits and negotiation efforts expended by both regulated polluting facilities 
and environmentally concerned citizens play a role. 
We base our analysis on two theoretical models.  In the basic model, a national regulator 
exogenously establishes the effluent limit level imposed on a representative polluting facility, while a 
regional agency is responsible for monitoring and enforcing the effluent limit.  For this analysis, we 
consider two local environmental settings: strong assimilative capacity, which leads to “good” ambient 
water quality conditions (hereafter “good quality conditions”), and weak assimilative capacity, which 
leads to “bad” ambient water quality conditions (hereafter “bad quality conditions”).  We find that 
variations in the discharge limit influence the regional agency’s inspection decisions.  Moreover, 
depending on the stringency of the discharge limit, the monitoring agency chooses either an inspection 
strategy that is uniform between the two considered settings of ambient water quality conditions – 
good versus bad – or an inspection strategy that differentiates between these two settings.  
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In the extended model, the regional administrative body also includes a permit writer, who is 
ultimately responsible for establishing the effluent limit imposed on the regulated facility, while the 
national regulator imposes an effluent standard that merely represents an upper bound on the effluent 
limit eventually imposed on the regulated facility.  In the end, the permit writer endogenously selects 
the effluent limit level based on negotiation efforts expended by the regulated polluting facility and 
environmentally concerned citizens. We identify the conditions under which the effluent limit imposed 
on the regulated polluter differs from the national standard. These conditions relate to the political 
weight enjoyed and the negotiation effort costs faced by both citizens and the regulated facility, along 
with the stringency of the national standard and ambient quality. In general, we conclude that the 
application of a discharge limit is able to accommodate heterogeneity when different layers of 
government, such as local permit writers and monitoring agencies, are taken into account within the 
theoretical analysis. 
The rest of the paper explores the identified research objectives.  Section 2 identifies our 
study’s contribution to the economic literature.  Section 3 describes our basic theoretical model.  
Section 4 extends the basic model.  Section 5 concludes.  The Appendix provides all the proofs. 
2. Contribution to the Literature 
The present study contributes to two strands of literature: one strand that focuses on the 
interactions between regulatory stringency and enforcement strategies and another strand that 
investigates the political economy aspects of enforcement. Our results can also apply to other contexts. 
In this section, we discuss all of these issues. 
Firstly, we contribute to the growing literature that theoretically explores the relationship 
between regulatory stringency and both monitoring and enforcement strategies (e.g., Arguedas and 
Rousseau, 2009; Arguedas, 2008; Jones and Scotchmer, 1990; Jones, 1989; Keeler, 1995; Harford and 
Harrington, 1991; Veljanovski, 1984).  For example, Veljanovski (1984), Keeler (1995) and, more 
recently, Arguedas and Rousseau (2009) examine the influence of effluent limit levels on agency 
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monitoring and/or enforcement behavior.  However, in these studies, the standard is assumed to be 
exogenous, as opposed to the endogenous standard setting considered here.  Arguedas (2008) explores 
the endogenous determination of effluent limits in a setting with costly monitoring and sanctioning, 
while focusing on the compliance incentives generated by particular policy combinations.  However, 
Arguedas (2008) does not consider the hierarchical approach we take in our study and assumes that all 
of the policy parameters (the standard, the inspection probability, and the fine for non-compliance) are 
set by the same regulatory body.  Jones and Scotchmer (1990) consider a hierarchical approach but 
assume that the standard is exogenous and the inspection agency focuses only on deterrence, as 
opposed to the more general objective function for the inspection agency considered here.  Moreover, 
in Jones and Scotchmer (1990), the instrument used by the national regulator is the size of the budget 
allocated to the agency, while in our model the instrument used is the effluent standard.  Saha and 
Poole (2000) and Decker (2007) also consider hierarchical settings but construct a federal government 
that sets the penalty for non-compliance and a local authority that engages in monitoring and 
enforcement. Particularly, Decker (2007) considers exogenous standards and constructs a setting in 
which the federal regulator, who is responsible for setting fines, seeks to minimize social costs, yet the 
local agency, who is responsible for enforcement, seeks to minimize the sum of (1) enforcement costs 
and (2) the reputational costs stemming from  failures to undertake proper enforcement actions. 
While all of these previous studies on regulatory stringency and monitoring and enforcement 
substantially improve our understanding of environmental agency behavior, to the authors’ best 
knowledge, no previous theoretical study explores variations in effluent limit levels due to factors 
unrelated to the regulated entities’ compliance costs and the effect of this variation on agency behavior. 
 Secondly, our analysis contributes to the literature that uses political economy models to study 
enforcement strategies (e.g., Makowsky and Stratmann, 2009; Garoupa and Klerman, 2010; Cheng and 
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Lai, 2012; Ovaere et al. 2013).3 The study by Cheng and Lai (2012) is particularly relevant since it 
investigates the impact of interest groups on the regulatory stringency, while taking account of 
incomplete compliance. In the theoretical model, both shareholders of the polluting firms and 
environmentalists engage in lobbying and offer political contributions to the policymaker in order to 
influence the level of an emission tax. A somewhat surprising result of Cheng and Lai (2012) is that a 
stricter enforcement policy can lead to a higher actual emission level, particularly when the polluting 
firms have a relatively large political influence. Our model differs in several respects from the model 
presented in Cheng and Lai (2012): [1] we explore an emission limit rather than an emission tax; [2] 
we endogenously determine the monitoring strategy, while Cheng and Lai (2012) assume monitoring 
and sanctioning is exogenous; [3] we impose a binding upper standard on the emission limit, while 
Cheng and Lai (2012) do not constrain the regulatory agent’s choice of the emission tax level; and [4] 
we allow a hierarchical structure of the regulating government, while Cheng and Lai (2012) model a 
single-layered government. 
Thirdly, while our theoretical analysis draws upon the context of the U.S. Clean Water Act, our 
analysis extends to other environmental regulatory contexts meeting these three criteria: (1) legal 
requirements are constrained asymmetrically by national or supra-national standards, (2) tighter limits 
are imposed due to local ambient conditions, and (3) a separation exists between the authorities 
responsible for establishment of the standard, issuance of the effluent limits, and monitoring of 
compliance with limits.  Most obvious, our analysis extends to regulatory efforts to control wastewater 
discharges from point sources in most developed countries.  For instance, the European Water 
Framework Directive (2000/60/EC) requires a minimal amount of ecological and chemical protection 
everywhere in the EU by defining a set of ambient water quality standards; yet this same directive 
                                                 
3
 Political economy models are used by many studies to explore various environmental policy settings, such as 
those relating to climate protection and trade.  Several of these studies explore the effects of institutional 
changes on the stringency of environmental regulation, with some studies considering the role of lobbying: 
Fredriksson (1997), Damania et al. (2003), Binder and Neumayer (2005), Markussen and Svendsen (2005), and 
Gullberg (2008).  However, these papers all assume full compliance and ignore the role played by enforcement 
policy. 
8 
 
obligates member states to establish more stringent requirements for identified zones where more 
protection is needed to support to particular uses (e.g., source of drinking water). 
As important, our analysis extends to regulatory efforts to control air pollutant emissions from 
stationary sources in most developed countries.  For example, the U.S. Clean Air Act dictates that 
tighter emission limit levels are imposed on stationary sources operating in counties that are out of 
attainment with National Ambient Air Quality Standards (Greenstone, 2002, 2004).  As another 
example, Belgian environmental protection permits may account for local ambient conditions.  
Specifically, in Belgium, a regional agency imposes general permit requirements, which include 
effluent standards that are based on best available technologies or techniques; however, local 
administrators can impose effluent limits that are stricter, but not laxer, than the effluent standards, as 
needed in order to protect the local environment as guided by ambient standards (Lavrysen, 2009).  
Regardless of the permit stringency, the environmental inspectorate is responsible for monitoring and 
enforcing compliance with the limits. 
Our analysis also extends to waste policy.  For example, as part of its waste control efforts, the 
EU determines the minimal collection requirements for products, packaging, and waste associated with 
electrical and electronic equipment (e.g., WEEE Directive 2012/19/EU).  However, EU member states’ 
governments can raise their national or regional collection targets above any EU minimum. Consistent 
with this differentiation, while countries such as Belgium and the Netherlands impose high collection 
rates, other countries are struggling to achieve the EU minima (Dubois, 2013).  As important, each EU 
member state is responsible for monitoring and enforcing these collection targets. 
Lastly, our analysis also extends to pipeline safety efforts.  For example, the U.S. Pipeline and 
Hazardous Safety Materials Administration (PHMSA) regulates pipelines by setting minimum federal 
standards with which all pipeline operators must comply, yet the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) 
[which lies within PHMSA], along with approved state regulators, implements the regulatory program 
by monitoring compliance and taking enforcement actions against non-compliance.  Stricter set of 
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controls are imposed in “high consequence” areas where the risk for damage to the environment, 
including human health, is greater (Stafford, 2012). 
3. Basic Model without Negotiation over the Effluent Limit Level 
This section presents the basic theoretical model in which the national regulator exogenously 
establishes effluent limit levels.  Since our analysis focuses on the regulatory context of wastewater 
pollution, hereafter we use the more accurate technical terms of “discharges” and “discharge limits”. 
3.1. Model Setup 
We consider a regional district subject to environmental regulation.  In this district, a 
representative facility discharges pollution into a water body, while a national regulator and a regional 
agency interact to address the environmental problem.  The national regulator sets a discharge limit to 
restrict discharges from the facility operating in the particular region, as well as a fine structure that 
applies if the facility is discovered exceeding the limit. The regional agency is responsible for 
enforcing the discharge limit and sets an inspection probability. The sequence of decisions is depicted 
in Figure 1. 4 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
We assume that the water body can possess one of two possible types of assimilative capacity 
: strong assimilative capacity, which leads to good quality conditions,  , or weak assimilative 
capacity, which leads to bad quality conditions, , such that    . Let  denote the level of 
pollution discharged by representative facility of type  into the water body of quality , and let 	   
represent the discharge level without regulation in place, such that  
 	 . The facility can reduce its 
discharges at a cost depending on the discharge level and the facility’s type. For simplicity, the facility 
can be one of two possible types, a high-abatement cost facility () or a low-abatement cost facility 
(), such that   . The abatement costs of a facility of type  are represented by the function 
                                                 
4
 In this section, we do not explicitly model the limit and fine setting decisions of the national regulator. In 
Section 4, we allow the stringency of the discharge limit to be endogenously determined. 
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 , , such that ,   0 for all   	 , , 	   0, and  ,   0 for all 
 
 	 .5  For a given discharge level e, we assume that ,    , , ,    , , 
and ,  
  , .6 
The facility’s discharges cause local environmental damages in the water body, which also 
depend on water quality . Thus, environmental damages can be represented by the function  
,  with .   0 and	.   0. For a given discharge level e, we assume that ,  
,  and ,   , 	7. 
The national regulator establishes the discharge limit and fine structure.  The discharge limit is 
denoted as . We assume that the limit does not depend on the type of the facility (), although it 
may vary between the two different qualities of the water body (). We also assume that the fine 
structure for non-compliance is linear:8 
   ∙  !"0,  # $, 		where	  0. (1) 
 The regional agency is responsible for enforcing the discharge limit and sets an inspection 
probability for a facility of type  discharging into a water body of quality . This probability is 
denoted as ), such that 0 
 ) 
 1. The cost per inspection is m > 0. We assume that the regional 
agency has perfect information on the category to which a facility belongs; thus, discharges are 
perfectly known without inspection. However, monitoring is still needed to document formally a 
violation.  
                                                 
5
  The first condition reveals that high abatement cost facilities face higher abatement costs than low abatement 
cost facilities when both types are discharging the same amount. The second condition indicates that high 
abatement facilities face higher marginal abatement costs. The third condition controls the curvature of the 
abatement cost function. 
6
  The first two conditions indicate that marginal abatement costs are positive for all discharge levels below the 
level chosen when no regulation exists yet marginal abatement costs equal zero at the discharge level chosen 
when no regulation exists. The third condition controls the curvature of the abatement cost function. 
7
 The first comparison indicates that damages are greater under bad water quality conditions than under good 
water quality conditions. As important, the second comparison reveals that marginal damages are greater under 
bad water quality conditions. 
8
 In the concluding section, we assess the implications of a convex fine structure. 
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The objective of the (risk-neutral) facility is to choose the discharge level that minimizes the 
sum of abatement costs and expected fines. Therefore, for a given regulatory policy ", , )$, a 
facility of type  discharging into a water body of quality  solves the following problem: 
min"./$ 	0 ,  1 ) !"0,  # $2 .     (2) 
The inspection agency chooses inspection probabilities while considering abatement costs, 
environmental damages, and monitoring costs.  Specifically, we assume that the agency’s objective 
function is the following: 
min"3./$ 	04 ,  1  ,  1 )2 ,      (3) 
where 4  0  reflects the importance given by the inspection agency to abatement costs, relative to the 
sum of environmental damages and monitoring costs.9 
 After the limit  and the fine parameter f are made public, the agency announces the 
inspection probability ) for facility type 5 ∈ 78, 9:
 
and water quality type ; ∈ 7<, =:. The facility 
then reacts to the environmental policy ", , )$ by selecting its discharge level. 
We solve the entire problem backwards in order to find the sub-game perfect equilibrium.  
3.2. Decision Making 
As part of this backward problem solving process, we discuss the decisions made by the facility 
and the regional agency in that order. 
3.2.1. Facility 
Given the policy ", , )$, the objective of the (risk-neutral) facility is to choose the 
discharge level  that minimizes the sum of abatement costs and expected fines, as expressed in (2).  
The solution to this problem is presented below in Lemma 1; the proof of the solution is presented in 
the Appendix. 
                                                 
9
 Keeler (1995) introduces this same parameter 4. If 0 < 4  1, abatement costs matter but enjoy a lower 
priority than environmental damages and monitoring costs. If 4  1, then the agency’s concerns about 
facilities’ abatement costs dominate the other concerns. 
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Lemma 1. Given ", , )$, the optimal discharge level of the facility of type  into a water 
body of quality , denoted as ̃, is identified by the following conditions: 
, ̃ 1 )  0, (4a) 
?  ̃  , (4b) 
0, ̃ 1 )20̃ # 2  0. (4c) 
Therefore, the facility’s optimal response to the regulatory policy is to comply with the discharge limit 
(i.e., ̃  ) when the marginal expected fine for non-compliance is larger than the marginal 
abatement cost savings of exceeding the limit, i.e., when  )  #, .10  However, the optimal 
response of the facility is to exceed the limit (̃  ) if the marginal expected fine lies below the 
marginal abatement cost savings evaluated at the limit.  In that case, the facility chooses the discharge 
level that equates the marginal abatement cost savings and marginal expected fine, that is, , ̃ 1
)  0.  Note that ̃  	  as long as )  0. 
 From the above expression, we can easily define the minimum (or threshold) inspection 
probability that induces the facility of type i to comply with the legal limit as follows: 
)̅  # ABCD.,/
EF
G  .          (5) 
Our assumptions ensure that )̅  )̅ since ,    , . Moreover, for the case 
where the discharge limit does not depend on water quality (  ), the threshold inspection 
probability does not depend on water quality either ()̅  )̅) since water quality does not affect 
abatement costs.  
                                                 
10
 In a static model with deterministic discharges such as ours, the facility never chooses to reduce its discharge 
level strictly below the limit. This reduction merely increases abatement costs without any fine savings. 
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3.2.2. Regional Agency 
The objective of the regional agency is to choose inspection probabilities that minimize the 
weighted sum of abatement costs, environmental damages, and monitoring costs, as expressed in (3), 
while taking into account the facility’s best response, the legal discharge limit, and the fine: 
min"3./$ 	04 ,  1  ,  1 )2  
H. I.										,  1 )  0;   ;  
 	        (6) 
In order to describe the agency’s inspection decisions, we identify K  as the inspection 
agency’s preferred discharge level of a facility of cost type  discharging into a water body of quality 
. This discharge level satisfies the optimality condition: 
4, K 1 K ,  # ABBCD.,./
LF
G  0. (7) 
Our assumptions guarantee the following ranking of the agency’s preferred discharge levels: K 
K 	for all ; ∈ 7<, =: and	K  K  for all 5 ∈ 78, 9:. Also, the larger is 4  (i.e., the larger is the weight 
the regional agency places on the facility’s abatement costs), the larger is the preferred discharge levels 
K , and vice versa. Based on Lemma 1, the inspection probability )K  that induces each of these 
identified discharge levels is simply: 
)K  # ABCD.,./
LF
G  .          (8) 
The solution to the agency’s optimization problem is presented below in Lemma 2; the proof of 
the solution is provided in the Appendix. 
Lemma 2. The regional agency’s optimal inspection strategy, denoted as )M, depends on the 
level of the discharge limit as follows: 
)M  N)
K ,			 
 K)̅ ,			  K           (9) 
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Therefore, as long as the legal discharge limit  is sufficiently strict (i.e., when the legal limit lies 
below the agency’s preferred discharge level), the regional agency can implement its preferred 
discharge level by setting  )M  )K .  In this case, the facility exceeds the legal limit by selecting its 
discharges to equal the regional agency’s preferred discharge level. However, for a sufficiently lax 
legal limit (i.e., when the legal limit lies above the agency’s preferred discharge level), the optimal 
inspection strategy is )M 	 )̅, which leads the facility to comply with the limit. 
The optimal inspection strategies and the induced discharge levels are depicted in Figures 2 and 
3.  Each figure shows how the optimal inspection probability and the induced discharge level change 
as the discharge limit varies. Specifically, the upper graph of each figure shows the relationship 
between the stringency of the limit and the optimal inspection probability, while the lower graph of 
each figure shows the resulting facility’s best response to both the legal limit and the inspection 
probability. Figure 2 displays how these relationships differ between the two different water quality 
levels while considering the same facility cost type.  Figure 3 displays how these relationships differ 
between the two facility cost types while considering the same level of water quality. 
[INSERT FIGURES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Figure 2 illustrates that the optimal inspection strategy depends on both the stringency of the 
discharge limit and the level of the water quality. As shown in the upper graph, when the uniform 
discharge limit lies at or below the agency’s preferred level of discharges under bad water quality 
conditions (K ), the agency inspects more frequently when the facility is operating under bad water 
quality conditions than when the facility is operating under good water quality conditions. The extra 
monitoring pressure under bad conditions is needed to induce the agency’s lower preferred discharge 
level. As shown in the lower graph, the agency’s preferred discharges under bad water quality 
conditions, K , are clearly less than the agency’s preferred discharges under good quality conditions, 
K .  As long as the discharge limit lies below K , both inspection probabilities and both discharge 
levels are independent of the discharge limit because the limit does not constrain the agency’s choice. 
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Once the discharge limit rises above K , as shown in the upper graph, the optimal inspection 
probability under bad water quality conditions begins to fall because the discharge limit constrains the 
regional agency’s choice under these conditions.  Since the agency cannot induce over-compliance 
with the discharge limit, the agency is resigned to inducing exact compliance with the discharge limit.  
As shown in the lower graph, the induced discharge level tracks perfectly with the discharge limit 
along the 45 degree line. As the discharge limit level rises further above K , the monitoring pressure 
needed to induce exact compliance with a rising discharge limit falls, i.e., the optimal inspection 
probability drops. 
Similarly, once the discharge limit rises above K , the optimal inspection probability under 
good water quality conditions begins to fall. At discharge limit levels above K , the discharge limit 
constrains the regional agency’s choice even under good water quality conditions. Again, since the 
agency cannot induce over-compliance with the discharge limit, the agency is resigned to inducing 
exact compliance with the discharge limit. As shown in the lower graph, again the induced discharge 
level tracks the discharge limit along the 45 degree line. As the discharge limit level rises further above 
∗ , the monitoring pressure needed to induce exact compliance falls. 
Taken together, these conditions indicate that once the discharge limit lies above the agency’s 
preferred discharge level under good water quality conditions (  K ), the uniform discharge limit 
binds the agency’s choice regardless of the water quality conditions.  In this case, the agency is 
constrained to induce exact compliance whether quality conditions are good or bad, as shown in the 
lower graph. Consistently, the extent of monitoring pressure does not depend on water quality 
conditions, as shown in the upper graph. 
When the discharge limit lies between K  and K , the optimal inspection probability under bad 
water quality exceeds the optimal inspection probability under good water quality conditions, as shown 
in the upper graph.  Even though the agency is constrained to induce only exact compliance under bad 
water quality conditions, so the inspection probability is lower than otherwise desired, the monitoring 
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pressure needed to induce compliance exceeds the monitoring pressure needed to induce the agency’s 
preferred discharge level under good quality conditions.  Consistent with this difference, discharges 
under bad water quality conditions are lower than discharges under good water quality conditions, as 
shown in the lower graph. 
Most interesting, the upper graph of Figure 2 shows that the regional agency implements a 
differentiated inspection strategy, under which the agency applies greater monitoring pressure under 
bad water quality conditions, as long as the discharge limit does not bind under good water quality 
conditions (  K ).  Once the discharge limit binds under both bad and good water quality 
conditions (  K ), the regional agency implements a uniform inspection strategy under which the 
agency does not condition its monitoring pressure on water quality conditions. 
Moreover, the lower graph of Figure 2 shows that the agency does not always induce 
compliance.  When the discharge limit is sufficiently loose (  K ), the facility is compliant 
regardless of water quality conditions.  However, when the discharge limit is sufficiently tight ( 
K ), the facility is non-compliant regardless of water quality conditions. In between these two 
extremes (K    K ), the facility is compliant only under bad water quality conditions and non-
compliant under good water quality conditions. 
Figure 3 displays the relationships involving the optimal inspection strategy, the induced 
discharge level, and the imposed discharge limit for the two facility types and a given water quality 
level.  The explanation of this figure is analogous to that of Figure 2.  Here, the upper graph of Figure 
3 shows that the regional agency always implements a differentiated inspection strategy, applying 
greater monitoring pressure under high costs, regardless of the discharge limit. The lower graph of 
Figure 3 shows that the facility is compliant when the discharge limit is sufficiently loose (  K ) 
and non-compliant when the discharge limit is sufficiently tight (  K ), regardless of the cost type. 
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In between these two extremes (K 
   K ), only the low cost facility is compliant, while the 
high cost facility is non-compliant. 
 
4. Extended Model: Negotiation over the Effluent Limit Level 
In this section, we extend the basic model in order to understand better the setting of the 
discharge limit. We now include a permit writer, who is ultimately responsible for establishing the 
discharge limit imposed on the regulated facility. 
4.1. Model Setup 
As with the basic model, we consider decision making at three levels: national, regional, and 
facility.  However, we now expand the regional administrative body so that the inspection agency lies 
within a larger regional authority composed of two independent branches: (1) an inspection agency, 
which is responsible for enforcing the discharge limit, as in the basic model, and (2) a permit writer, 
who is ultimately responsible for establishing the discharge limit imposed on the regulated facility.  
Given this expanded role for the regional authority, we re-interpret the national regulator’s role in 
establishing the discharge limit. Now the national regulator imposes a discharge standard that 
represents an upper bound on the discharge limit eventually imposed on the facility.  In this context, 
the permit writer must decide whether to impose a discharge limit equaling the national standard or to 
tighten the discharge limit to a level below the national standard.  In this extended model, the permit 
writer’s decision depends on negotiations with both concerned citizens and the regulated facility.  
Figure 4 illustrates this situation.   
[INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
This situation involves four stages. In the first stage, the national regulator sets a uniform 
discharge standard, denoted as ̅, and a linear fine for non-compliance, again denoted as . We 
purposively use the term “standard” for the discharge level set by the national regulator and the term 
“limit” for the discharge level set by the permit writer.  We again treat this phase as exogenous. 
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In the second stage, the regional permit writer assesses the discharge limit to be imposed on the 
facility.  Specifically, the permit writer gathers information from concerned citizens and the regulated 
facility and hears the concerns of both parties.  Based on this information and these concerns, the 
permit writer may decide to tighten the discharge limit to a level below the national standard. The 
imposed discharge limit is again denoted as  even though it represents a “negotiated” discharge 
limit.11  We label this phase as the permit hearing and writing phase. 
In the third stage, the inspection agency, which is responsible for enforcing the negotiated 
discharge limit, , sets the inspection probabilities, ). 
In the fourth and final stage, the facility selects its discharge level as its best response to the 
multi-faceted environmental policy ", , )$. 
Relative to the basic model, this extended model adds the permit hearing and writing phase.  
This phase demands additional structure in order to shape the analysis.  First, we assume that citizens 
act as a collective environmental advocacy group.  In this capacity, citizens aim to minimize the sum 
of expected environmental damages and the costs of their negotiation effort. Let u > 0 denote the unit 
cost of negotiation effort and g denote the amount of citizen negotiation effort.  The citizens’ objective 
is captured as follows: 
min7P: Q C CRF , F 1 SRT.        (10) 
Given this objective, the citizens’ chosen amount of negotiation effort decreases with the cost of 
negotiation, S, but (weakly) increases with the discharge limit, . The latter relationship follows 
because increasing the limit (weakly) increases environmental damages since discharges (weakly) rise 
as the limit grows, as shown in Figures 2 and 3.  Thus, we can write the citizens’ best response as 
R  R, S, which involves the following partial derivatives: R/E, S  0 and RU, S  0. 
                                                 
11
 In this section, ̅, denotes the discharge standard set by the national regulator, while  represents the 
discharge limit imposed by the permit writer. In the previous section,  denotes the discharge limit imposed by 
the national regulator.  In both cases,  denotes the limit ultimately faced by the facility. 
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Second, the regulated facility minimizes the sum of abatement costs, expected fines for non-
compliance, and its own negotiation costs.  Let V  0 denote the unit cost of the facility’s negotiation 
effort and h denote the amount of facility negotiation effort.  The facility’s objective is captured as 
follows: 
min7W: 	0 ,  1 ) !"0,  # X$ 1 VX2.     (11) 
The facility pressures the permit writer so that he/she does not tighten the discharge limit since the sum 
of abatement costs and expected fines for non-compliance is decreasing in the discharge limit. 
Therefore, the amount of negotiation effort expended by the facility is a function of the discharge limit 
and the cost of negotiation,	X  X, V, which involves the following partial derivatives: 
X/E, V  0 and XY, V  0.  
Finally, the regional permit writer considers its own effort costs of tightening the discharge 
limit below the national standard and the costs of being confronted with negotiation efforts by citizens 
and the facility.  The permit writer’s effort costs of tightening the discharge limit are represented by 
Z  Z̅ # , such that Z0  0 and Z′0  0 for ̅   yet Z̅ #   0 and Z\̅ #  
0 for ̅  .  This function represents the costs of obtaining information to prove that a tighter 
discharge limit might be needed in the region due to the region’s idiosyncratic environmental 
circumstances.  Also, we assume that the unit cost of being confronted with negotiation efforts by the 
citizens and the facility are respectively denoted as ]P  0 and ]W  0.  The permit writer chooses the 
discharge limit level in order to minimize the sum of its tightening effort costs and confrontational 
costs subject to the restriction that the discharge limit level may not exceed the national standard and 
the response functions of the citizens and regulated facility:  
min^/E_0Z̅ #  1 ]PR 1 ]WX2        (12a) 
s.t.     
 ̅;	R  R, S;	X  X, V, (12b) 
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where g(·) and h(·) respectively capture the negotiation efforts of the citizens and the regulated facility 
as responses to the discharge limit set by the permit writer. 
Figure 5 presents the timing of the interaction involving the national regulator, permit writer, 
inspection agency, and facility. We solve the model backwards in order to identify the subgame perfect 
equilibrium. 
[INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
4.2. Decision Making 
When solving the model backwards, we examine in order the decision making of the facility, 
agency, and permit writer. As shown in Figure 5, Stages 1, 3, and 4 are exactly the same as those 
presented in the basic model. Lemma 1 presents the optimal response of the facility regarding its 
discharge level (Stage 4), while Lemma 2 presents the regional agency’s optimal inspection probability 
(Stage 3).  Moreover, Figures 2 and 3 remain valid as graphical illustrations of the results connected 
with these two stages.  Stage 1 reflects only the national regulator’s exogenous determination of the 
upper bound on the discharge limit along with the linear term of the fine function.  Therefore, in this 
sub-section we concentrate on the new component of Stage 2: permit hearing and writing phase. 
As described in (12), the permit writer seeks to minimize the sum of effort costs and 
confrontational costs, constrained by the national regulator’s upper bound standard on the discharge 
limit and the response functions of the citizens and facility.  Given this objective and these constraints, 
we identify the permit writer’s optimal discharge limit in Proposition 1 below. 
Proposition 1. Given the national regulator’s choice of discharge standard and fine parameter 
̅, , the optimal discharge limit set by the permit writer satisfies the following conditions: 
Z\̅ #  # ]WX/E, V  ]PR/E, S, (13a) 
̅  , (13b) 
QZ\̅ #  # ]WX/E, V # ]PR/E, SPT 0̅ # 2  0. (13c) 
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We explore these three conditions.  Consider the first optimality condition – equation (13a).  
The term Z\̅ #  # ]WX/E, V lies on the left hand side of equation (13a).  This term 
represents the marginal cost of tightening the discharge limit, which is composed, respectively, of the 
marginal cost of the administrative effort needed to tighten the limit and the marginal cost of being 
confronted with increased negotiation effort by the regulated facility. The term ]PR/E, S lies on 
the right hand side of equation (13a). This term represents the marginal benefit of tightening the 
discharge limit as captured by the permit writer’s marginal cost savings of being confronted with less 
effort by citizens. The second optimality condition – equation (13b) – simply reflects the binding 
nature of the national regulator’s discharge standard, which represents an upper bound on the discharge 
limit.  The third optimality condition – equation (13c) – combines the first two components as part of 
the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (see the Appendix for details). 
In sum, Proposition 1 tells us that it is optimal for the permit writer to not tighten the discharge 
limit, so that  remains equal to ̅, as long as Z\0 # ]WX/E̅, V  ]PR/E̅, S. This condition 
holds when the marginal costs of tightening the limit outweigh the corresponding marginal benefits, 
evaluated at   ̅.  On the other hand, it is optimal to tighten the limit, so that   ̅, when the 
opposite condition is met. This condition holds when the marginal costs of tightening the limit are 
lower than the corresponding marginal benefits, evaluated at   ̅.  In this latter case, the optimal 
discharge limit set by the permit writer satisfies the first optimality condition by equating marginal 
costs and marginal benefits: Z\̅ #  # ]WX/E, V  ]PR/E, S. 
Based on our assessment of the optimality conditions shown in (13), we are able to identify the 
conditions under which the discharge limit set by the permit writer equals the national standard.  First, 
we immediately see that the discharge limit equals the national standard as long as the citizens possess 
insufficient political weight; for example, in the extreme case where citizens have zero political 
weight,	]P= 0, the marginal benefits of tightening the limit below the standard become zero.  Second, 
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the discharge limit equals the national standard when either the citizens’ negotiation effort costs are 
large enough or the facility’s negotiation effort costs are small enough.  Third, the discharge limit set 
by the permit writer equals the national standard when the latter is already sufficiently strict. In terms 
of the relationships shown in Figure 3, this condition corresponds to the case of a national standard set 
below the agency’s preferred discharges of the low cost facility: ̅ 
 K .  In this case, tightening the 
discharge limit even more has no effect on environmental damages since the facility does not reduce its 
discharges when the limit lies below K  because the agency does not exert the monitoring pressure 
needed to induce discharges below K .  As a result of the agency’s choice, it is worthless for citizens 
to exert any negotiation effort.  Given a particular standard ̅, the greater is the importance given by the 
inspection agency to the facility’s abatement costs (i.e., the larger is 4), the larger is K .  Therefore, 
the condition of ̅ 
 K  is more likely met.  Consequently, the discharge limit imposed by the permit 
writer is more likely to equal the national standard.  Fourth, the discharge limit is more likely to equal 
the national standard under good water quality conditions than under bad water quality conditions. 
Figure 2 helps to explain this conclusion.  Since K  K , the national standard is more likely to lie 
below K  than below K . Therefore, citizens enjoy more leverage to exert negotiation effort under bad 
water quality conditions than under good water quality conditions.  Under bad conditions, citizens are 
better able to reduce environmental damages by prompting the permit writer to tighten the discharge 
limit in the event that the national standard is set above K . 
In sum, the negotiated discharge limit depends on the political weight granted to citizens and 
the regulated facility by the permit writer, the negotiation effort costs borne by the citizens and 
regulated facility, the stringency of the national standard relative to the agency’s preferred discharge 
levels, and water quality conditions.  
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5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we study the relationships among the stringency of effluent limits imposed on 
individual polluting facilities, environmental protection agencies’ monitoring decisions, and the 
ambient quality of the local environment.  We first consider a basic setting in which the discharge limit 
is exogenous.  In the extended model, we include negotiation efforts expended by regulated polluting 
facilities and environmentally concerned citizens to influence the establishment of the discharge limit 
by a permit writer. 
Regarding the basic model, we find that the monitoring agency chooses either an inspection 
strategy that is uniform between the two sets of ambient water quality conditions – good versus bad – 
or an inspection strategy that differentiates between these two sets of conditions, depending on the 
stringency of the discharge limit.  In contrast, the monitoring agency chooses an inspection strategy 
that differentiates between low cost facilities and high cost facilities independent of the discharge limit 
stringency.  Regarding the extended model, we identify the conditions under which the discharge limit 
imposed on a regulated polluter differs from a national standard, which represents an upper bound on 
the limit.  In particular, the negotiated discharge limit depends on the political weight granted to 
citizens and the regulated facility by the permit writer, the negotiation effort costs borne by the citizens 
and facility, the stringency of the national standard relative to the agency’s preferred discharge levels, 
and water quality conditions.  Thus, the application of a discharge limit is able to accommodate 
heterogeneity when different layers of government, such as local permit writers and monitoring 
agencies, are taken into account within theoretical analysis. 
We next assess the implications of relaxing certain assumptions. As one assumption, we model 
a linear fine structure. If we instead consider a convex fine structure, Figures 2 and 3 must be 
modified.  The main modification concerns the effect of the discharge limit level on the facility’s 
chosen discharge level.  Since the marginal fine in this case is increasing in the degree of non-
compliance, a lower limit induces a lower discharge level.  In terms of Figures 2 and 3, this connection 
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implies that the facility’s best response under non-compliance is no longer horizontal but increasing in 
the discharge limit, with a slope less than 1, which reflects the fact that a lower discharge limit leads to 
a larger degree of non-compliance.  Given this relationship under a convex fine structure, concerned 
citizens are inclined to negotiate a reduction in the discharge limit below the national standard even 
when the standard lies below K  or K , depending on circumstances, since the monitoring agency is 
now able to induce further reductions in the facility’s discharge level within the relevant range.  
Therefore, all else equal, the permit writer is more likely to tighten the discharge limit below the 
national standard under a convex fine structure than under a linear fine structure. 
As another assumption, we posit that the regional agency’s budget constraint is not binding.  If 
we instead posit a binding budget, the likelihood of compliance decreases.  In terms of Figures 2 and 3, 
this decrease implies that the range of discharge limit values that induce non-compliance expands. 
Since the facility’s best response is constant under non-compliance, the presence of a binding budget 
decreases the likelihood that the permit writer tightens the discharge limit below the national standard, 
all else equal. 
Lastly, we claim that our results apply to other environmental regulatory contexts beyond water 
quality protection.  As important, we claim that our results are applicable to other realms of safety 
protection where the stringency of safety controls depends on the risk of damage to human safety, such 
as in the contexts of transportation safety, occupational safety, and product safety.  For example, 
transportation speed limits are tighter in areas where children are likely to be playing, e.g., near 
schools; tighter occupational safety controls are imposed where pregnant women are working; etc.  
While our results should apply to these other contexts, future theoretical research should model these 
contexts explicitly.   
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APPENDIX 
Proof of Lemma 1 
The regulated facility never discharges a level below the limit  since the regulated facility 
would then incur additional abatement costs without additional benefits because fines are positive only 
for discharge levels above the limit. Therefore, we can write the Lagrangian of the facility’s 
optimization problem as follows: 
9, `   ,  1 ) #  # ` # , (A1) 
where `  0 is the corresponding Kuhn-Tucker multiplier of the inequality restriction   .  The 
first-order conditions of this problem are the following: 
,  1 ) # `  0; (A2a) 
` #   0. (A2b) 
Depending on the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier, two cases exist.  In one case,    implies that  `  0, 
which further implies that ,  1 )  0.  In the other case,    implies that `  0, 
which further implies that ,  1 )  0.  The desired result is obtained by combining both 
cases and incorporating the condition that   ?  whenever )  	0 (  ?  only if )  0). 
Proof of Lemma 2 
 Assuming a positive inspection probability (which results in   ? ) and identifying the 
threshold probability as )̅  # ABCD.,/
EF
G , we can write the optimization problem of the regional 
agency as follows: 
min"3./$ 	04 ,  1  ,  1 )2       (A3a) 
H. I.										,  1 )  0;   ; ) 
 )̅      (A3b) 
The Lagrangian of this problem is the following: 
             9), `, a, b  4 ,  1 ,  #  ABD.,./G # a #  1 b) # )̅,  (A4) 
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where a  0	and	b  0 are respectively the corresponding Kuhn-Tucker multipliers of the constraints 
 #   0 and ) # )̅ 
 0. The first-order conditions of this problem can be written as follows: 
4,  1 ,  # ABBD.,./G # 	a  0, (A5a) 
,  1 )  0, (A5b) 
a #   0, (A5c) 
b) # )̅  0. (A5d) 
Depending on the value of the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier associated with the discharge limit level, two 
cases exist.  On the one hand,	a  0 implies   K  , which is induced by )K , defined in (8). 
On the other hand, a  0 implies     K , which is induced by )̅, defined in (5).   
Proof of Proposition 1 
The Lagrangian of the permit writer’s optimization problem is the following: 
9, `  Z̅ #  1 ]PR, SP 1 ]WX, SW 1 ` # ̅,  (A6) 
where `  0 is the corresponding Kuhn-Tucker multiplier of the weak inequality restriction  
 ̅.  
We can write the first-order conditions of this problem as follows: 
#Z\̅ #  1 ]WX/E, SW 1 ]PR/E, SP 1 `  0, (A7a) 
` # ̅  0. (A7b) 
Depending on the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier, two cases exist.  In one case, `  0 implies that 
#Z\̅ #  1 ]WX/E, SW 1 ]PR/E, SP  0 and  
 ̅.  In the other case, `  0 implies 
that Z\0 # ]WX/E, SW  ]PR/E, SP and   ̅.  Taken together, these two sets of 
conclusions demonstrate the desired result.  
27 
 
REFERENCES 
Arguedas, Carmen (2008), “To Comply or Not To Comply? Pollution Standard Setting under Costly 
Monitoring and Sanctioning,” Environmental and Resource Economics, 41(2), 155-8. 
Arguedas, Carmen and Sandra Rousseau (2009), “A Note on the Complementarity of Uniform 
Emission Standards and Monitoring Strategies,” working paper. 
Binder, Seth and Eric Neumayer (2005), “Environmental Pressure Group Strength and Air Pollution: 
An Empirical Analysis,” Ecological Economics, 55, 527–538. 
Cheng, Chu-Chuan and Yu-Bong Lai (2012), “Does a Stricter Enforcement Policy Protect the 
Environment? A Political Economy Perspective.” Resource and Energy Economics, 34, 431–441. 
Damania, Richard, Fredriksson, Per G., and John A. List (2003). Trade Liberalization, Corruption, and 
Eenvironmental Policy Formation: Theory and Evidence. Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management, 46, 490–512. 
Decker, Christopher S. (2007). Flexible Enforcement and Fine Adjustement. Regulation & 
Governance, 1, 312-328. 
Dubois, Maarten (2013), Economic Instruments for European Waste Management. Doctoral thesis, 
Faculty of Business and Economics, KU Leuven. 
Earnhart, Dietrich and Robert Glicksman (2010), Pollution Limits and Polluters' Efforts to Comply: 
The Role of Government Monitoring and Enforcement, Stanford University Press: Palo Alto, CA. 
EPA (1990), “A Primer on the Office of Water Enforcement and Permits and Its Programs,” 
Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, DC. 
Fredriksson, Per G. (1997), “The Political Economy of Pollution Taxes in a Small Open Economy,” 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 33, 44–58. 
Garvie, Devon and Andrew Keeler (1994), “Incomplete Enforcement with Endogenous Regulatory 
Choice,” Journal of Public Economics, 55, 141-162. 
28 
 
Garoupa, Nuno and Daniel M. Klerman (2010), “Corruption and Private Law Enforcement: Theory 
and History,” Review of Law and Economics, 6(1), 75-96. 
Greenstone, Michael (2002), “The Impacts of Environmental Regulations on Industrial Activity: 
Evidence from the 1970 and 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments and the Census of Manufactures” 
Journal of Political Economy, 110 (6), 1175-1219. 
Greenstone, Michael (2004), “Did the Clean Air Act Cause the Remarkable Decline in Sulfur Dioxide 
Concentrations?” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 47, 585-611. 
Gullberg, Anne Therese (2008), “Rational Lobbying and EU Climate Policy,” International 
Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 8, 161–178. 
Harford, Jon and Winston Harrington (1991), “A Reconsideration of Enforcement Leverage when 
Penalties are Restricted,” Journal of Public Economics, 45, 391-395. 
Harrington, Winston (1988), “Enforcement Leverage When Penalties are Restricted,” Journal of 
Public Economics, 37, 29-53. 
Hunter, Susan and Richard Waterman (1996), Enforcing the Law: The Case of the Clean Water Acts, 
M.E. Sharpe: Armonk, NY. 
Jones, Carol Adaire (1989), “Standard Setting with Incomplete Enforcement Revisited,” Journal of 
Policy Analysis and Management, 8(1), 72-87. 
Jones, Carol Adaire and Suzanne Scotchmer (1990), “The Social Cost of Uniform Regulatory 
Standards in a Hierarchical Government,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 
19, 61-72. 
Keeler, Andrew (1995), “Regulatory Objectives and Enforcement Behavior,” Environmental and 
Resource Economics, 6, 73-85. 
Lavrysen, Luc (2009), Cursus milieurecht (“Syllabus Environmental Law”), Ghent University. 
Makowsky, Michael D. and Thomas Stratmann (2009), “Political Economy at any Speed: What 
Determines Traffic Citations?” American Economic Review, 99(1), 509-527. 
29 
 
Markussen, Peter and Gert Tinggaard Svendsen (2005), “Industry Lobbying and the Political Economy 
of GHG Trade in the EU,” Energy Policy, 33(2), 245–255. 
Ovaere, Lotte, Stef Proost and Sandra Rousseau (2013), “The Choice of Environmental Regulatory 
Enforcement by Lobby Groups,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Policy, 2(3), 328-347. 
Saha, Atanu and Graham Poole (2000). The Economics of Crime and Punishment: An Analysis of Optimal 
Penalty. Economics Letters, 68, 191-196. 
Stafford, Sarah (2012), “The Role of Enforcement in Improving the Performance of Pipelines in the 
US,” working paper, College of William and Mary. 
Veljanovski, C.G. (1984), “The Economics of Regulatory Enforcement,” in K. Hawkins and J.M. 
Thomas, eds., Enforcing Regulation, Kluwer-Nijhoff Publishing: Boston, MA. 
  
30 
 
Figure 1 
Basic Regulatory Context 
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Figure 2 
Optimal Inspection Strategy for a Given Facility Cost Type and Different Water Quality Levels 
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Figure 3 
Optimal Inspection Probability for a Given Water Quality Level and Different Facility Types 
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Figure 4 
Regulation of Discharges under Negotiation over the Discharge Limit 
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Figure 5 
Timing of Decisions in the Extended Model with Negotiation 
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